In this paper we analyze the effects of both tactical and programmatic politics on the inter-regional allocation of infrastructure investment. We use a panel of data for the Spanish electoral districts during the period 1964-2004 to estimate an equation where investment depends both on economic and political variables. The results show that tactical politics do matter since, after controlling for economic traits, the districts with more ‘Political power’ still receive more investment. These districts are those where the incumbents’ Vote margin of victory/ defeat in the past election is low, where the Marginal seat price is low, where there is Partisan alignment between the executives at the central and regional layers of government, and where there are Pivotal regional parties which are influential in the formation of the central executive. However, the results also show that programmatic politics matter, since inter-regional redistribution (measured as the elasticity of investment to per capita income) is shown to increase with the arrival of the Democracy and EU Funds, with Left governments, and to decrease the higher is the correlation between a measure of ‘Political power’ and per capita income.
In recent years various studies have examined the factors that may explain academic patents. Existing analyses have also underlined the substantial differences to be found in European countries in the institutional framework that defines property rights for academic patents. The objective of this study is to contribute to the empirical literature on the factors explaining academic patents and to determine whether the incentives that universities offer researchers contribute towards explaining the differences in academic patenting activity. The results of the econometric analysis for the Spanish universities point towards the conclusion that the principal factor determining the patents is funding of R&D while royalty incentives to researchers do not appear to be significant.
This paper examines the antecedents and innovation consequences of the methods firms adopt in organizing their search strategies. From a theoretical perspective, organizational search is described using a typology that shows how firms implement exploration and exploitation search activities that span their organizational boundaries. This typology includes three models of implementation: ambidextrous, specialized, and diversified implementation. From an empirical perspective, the paper examines the performance consequences when applying these models, and compares their capacity to produce complementarities. Additionally, since firms’ choices in matters of organizational search are viewed as endogenous variables, the paper examines the drivers affecting them and identifies the importance of firms’ absorptive capacity and diversified technological opportunities in determining these choices. The empirical design of the paper draws on new data for manufacturing firms in Spain, surveyed between 2003 and 2006.